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Abstract—Social media has become a primary mean of content
and information sharing, thanks to its speed and simplicity. In
this scenario, link previews play the important role of giving a
meaningful first glance to users, summarizing the content of the
shared webpage within their title, description and image. In our
work, we analyzed the preview-rendering process, observing how
it is possible to misuse it to obtain benign-looking previews for
malicious links. Concrete use-case of this research field is phishing
and spam spread, considering targeted attacks in addition to
large-scale campaigns.
We designed a set of experiments for 20 social media
platforms including social networks and instant messenger ap-
plications and found out how most of the platforms follow their
own preview design and format, sometimes providing partial
information. Four of these platforms allow preview crafting so
as to hide the malicious target even to a tech-savvy user, and
we found that it is possible to create misleading previews for the
remaining 16 platforms when an attacker can register their own
domain. We also observe how 18 social media platforms do not
employ active nor passive countermeasures against the spread of
known malicious links or software, and that existing cross-checks
on malicious URLs can be bypassed through client- and server-
side redirections. To conclude, we suggest seven recommendations
covering the spectrum of our findings, to improve the overall
preview-rendering mechanism and increase users’ overall trust
in social media platforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The way Internet users access online information has
changed dramatically. While not so long ago, users relied
on search engines to find new online content, nowadays
users predominantly follow links distributed over social media
platforms such as social networks and instant messaging to
discover web pages. For example, about 40% of web traffic
in 2017 originated from social networks [2], against the 37%
share of Google searches [2]. When sharing a link, instead
of showing the raw URL string, social platforms prepare a
user-friendly preview often containing an image, a title, and a
description extracted from the shared web page. Link previews
play an important role to reach and engage Internet users
by providing a meaningful overview of the page content and
inviting users to click on them to access more information.
Unfortunately, the popularity of social platforms has at-
tracted the attention of scammers and other malicious users,
who use social platforms to distribute malicious links exposing
users to a plethora of security risks ranging from online scams
and spam to more concerning risks such as exploitation of
0-day vulnerabilities in mobile devices (see, i.e., [3]). The
security risks of visiting malicious web pages have been at
the center of the attention of the past decades of research
activities, focusing on, for example, detection techniques [13],
[20], evaluation of defenses (e.g., [22], [30], [21]), studying
the attacker behavior (e.g., [16], [5]), and detection of evasion
techniques (e.g., [39], [18]). Only recently, the attention has
shifted on studying the extent to which these attacks entered
and adapted to social platforms. Existing work has studied
different aspects such as the pervasiveness of spam campaigns
in social networks (e.g., [32], [15]), the infrastructure used by
attackers to distribute malicious pages [29], and the accounts
spreading malicious content (e.g., [35], [9]). Other lines of
works looked at the demographics of the victims (e.g., [27]),
showing that individual and communities behavior influence
the likelihood to click.
This paper looks at the problem of malicious link distribu-
tion by investigating one of the elements used by attackers
to draw the attention of the victims, i.e., link previews.
Link previews synthesize the content of a web page, and
anecdotal evidence suggests that they are a fundamental piece
of information used by users to decide whether to click.
For example, in 2017, Facebook forbade users to modify the
content of link previews during the creation of posts [28] to
contain the creation of deceptive link previews to influence
user clicks [28]. This paper puts under the microscope the
connection that previews create between users and the actual
landing pages, with the overarching goal to provide a new
interpretation of the reasons why social platforms’ users click
on malicious links. Our investigation starts by delivering one
of the first characterizations of the process of the link preview
creation of 20 popular social media platforms. We provide
a comprehensive analysis covering three relevant aspects, i.e.,
the fields composing link previews, the layout of link previews,
the platforms’ behavior when fetching the web resources of
a preview. Once established a behavioral baseline, we probe
social platforms with malicious links to determine devia-
tions from our baseline and characterizing—if any—platforms’
defense mechanisms. Finally, starting from the observations
collected during our investigation, we show how an attacker
can create in practice effective malicious web pages that all
our 20 platforms display as benign-looking link previews. In
particular, in four of them, i.e., Facebook, Xing, Plurk and
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Slack, an attacker can stage such attacks by controlling the
content of the web pages only. Finally, we show how to bypass
existing countermeasures to avoid the detection of malicious
URLs.
This paper makes the following key findings. First, we
discovered seemingly innocuous behaviors when creating pre-
views that provide a great advantage to an attacker. For exam-
ple, on Facebook, an attacker can create a benign-looking link
preview of a malicious web page, fooling even experienced
and skilled Internet users. Similar attacks are effective against
other platforms too, such as Xing, Plurk, and Slack. Second,
the vast majority of the tested platforms do not implement
any countermeasure that prevents sharing malicious URLs.
Only two platforms (Twitter and LinkedIn) implement such
countermeasures and, sadly, they are improperly implemented,
allowing an attacker to bypass them with redirections. Third,
the shortcomings identified by our study are not merely techni-
cal issues and are not limited to a few social platforms. Instead,
we present a systematic problem affecting all platforms in the
ways they design and create previews. Our results show 14
distinct link preview layouts, each with several optional fields.
Such a large number of variations may fail to help users in
establishing trust with the previewed web sites. As a result,
users may overlook security-relevant signals and underestimate
the security risks of the previewed page, exposing themselves
to a plethora of web attacks. Finally, from the analysis of our
results, we distilled a list of seven recommendations, ranging
from short-term solutions to the technical shortcoming, to the
creation of a standard encoding for the content of link previews
and the rules to create them.
Contributions — To summarize, this paper makes the follow-
ing contributions:
• We present the first comprehensive study and charac-
terization of the link preview creation process of 20
popular social media platforms, showing which field
is shown under what circumstances;
• We present 14 distinct link preview templates and
variants across all platforms, indicating the lack of
consensus among all platforms;
• We perform a set of controlled experiments to de-
termine the presence of existing countermeasures on
social platforms, showing that all except for two
platforms do not implement any defense mechanism.
Furthermore, we perform additional tests to determine
their effectiveness, discovering that the two counter-
measures can be easily bypassed via redirections;
• We test the link preview creation in an adversarial
setting, showing that four platforms out of 20 can cre-
ate benign-looking previews for malicious resources,
fooling even experienced and skilled users;
• From our results, we distill 7 recommendations to-
wards more robust and trustworthy link previews;
Organization of the Paper — The content of the paper is
structured as follows: Section III presents the general behavior
of the social media platforms under test when posting a
regular link, creating a baseline for following observations
and comparisons. In Section IV we repeat the link submission
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Fig. 1: Sequence of steps when sharing pages on social
networks.
experiments providing the platforms with malicious content,
i.e., blacklisted links or known malware. We present con-
siderations on passive and active countermeasures employed
by each social media platform. Section V presents the link
preview creation under adversarial influence and presents our
attacks. Finally, Section VI presents a set of recommendations
and technical solutions.
II. BACKGROUND
Before presenting the study of this paper, we introduce
building block information. In Section II-A, we start by
introducing the general framework used to generate a link
preview, and then, in Section II-B, we present the list of social
media platforms that we selected for our evaluation. Finally,
in Section II-C, we introduce the threat model considered in
our analysis.
A. Sharing External Content on Social Media Platforms
Sharing text messages on social platforms, such as social
networks, is usually a straightforward process: a user logs into
the platform, types the message, and posts it. The message is
then stored and delivered to all friends when they update their
timeline. When the message contains a URL, the platform re-
trieves the resources in the shared page to build a link preview.
In theory, link previews can be created either by the client-side
program (e.g., Javascript) or the server-side programs. How-
ever, as URLs often originate from third-party domains, most
platforms cannot rely on the client-side programs because the
same-origin policy for cross-origin requests (SOP for CORs)
prevents the client-side programs from fetching resources from
other origins by default. Accordingly, platforms tend to use
server-side requests [25] (SSRs).
Figure 1 shows the sequence of steps when sharing URLs
on social platforms. The user accesses the social media plat-
form through their browser, or through a mobile app, and then
types the URL in the input box to share the URL content
with friends or contacts (Step 1 Figure 1). Then, the platform
performs a number of SSRs to retrieve the URL and the linked
resources, e.g., images (Step 2 Figure 1). Then, the platform
processes the collected resources to create a preview for the
webpage. The construction of the preview can be aided with
a set of additional HTML meta tags specifying suggested
content for each field of the preview, such as the page title
and page description. Two popular meta tags languages are
Open Graph [11] by Facebook and Twitter Cards [37] by
Twitter. Table I shows the list of meta tag types that can be
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Open Graph Twitter Cards Description
og:title twitter:title The title of the article without any branding
og:description twitter:description A brief description of the content.
og:image twitter:image The URL of the image that appears in the preview.
og:url - The canonical URL for the page, without session variables or user identifying parame-
ters. This URL is used to aggregate likes and shares.
TABLE I: Description of meta tags used to create the link preview of HTML content
<meta name="twitter:site" content="¬">
<meta name="twitter:title" content="­">
<meta name="twitter:description" content="®">
<meta name="twitter:image" content="¯">
<meta property="og:site_name" content="¬" />
<meta property="og:title" content="­" />
<meta property="og:description" content="®" />
<meta property="og:image" content="¯" />
Listing (1) Open Graph and Twitter Cards tags for both Previews
(a) Preview on Facebook (b) Preview on Twitter
Fig. 2: Example of real world use of meta tags.
used to create previews for HTML content. Listing 1 shows
an example of meta tag use to create two previews of the
same article. Figure 2 shows two screenshots for the resulting
previews.
B. Case Studies
We conduct the study of this paper on 20 popular social
media platforms, ten of which are social networks, and ten are
instant messaging apps. In this section, we present the selection
criteria we used.
1) Social Networks: We created an initial list of social
networks by combining two sources. First, we manually in-
spected the Alexa Top 1M domains, retrieved in May 2019,
and removed all the websites which do not fall under the Social
Network category (e.g. amazon.com); then, we manually vis-
ited the remaining ones until we collected 30 social networks,
with no pre-established cutoff on the domain rank value. Then,
we merged the 30 social network domains from the Alexa Top
1M domains with additional 30 domains of social networks
ranked by the number of users. For this ranking, we used
the list maintained by Wikipedia1, retrieved on July 2019.
Then, from these 60 social networks, we removed duplicates
obtaining a list of 47 social networks.
We inspected each of the 47 social networks manually,
and removed 37 of them for one of the following reasons: (i)
1See, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of social networking websites
social networks that no longer exist, (ii) we were unable to
create user accounts2, (iii) the social network is ranked too
low in the Alexa Top 1M, (iv) platforms that do not support
link sharing (e.g., Soundcloud), (v) platforms that require
Premium subscriptions, (vi) social networks that merged with
already discarded ones, and (vii) posting prevented due to bot
detection. Table II lists the 10 social networks that we used
for the study of this paper.
2) Instant Messaging Apps: We created the list of candidate
instant messaging apps by crawling the first 32 apps in order of
appearance from the category “Communication” of the Google
Play store. To these samples, we added six more apps (i.e.,
Instagram, Discord, Slack, Kik, Signal, and Snapchat), that we
considered popular but not part of the initial list. From these
38 apps, we removed duplicates obtaining a list of 28 instant
messaging apps. Then, we inspected each app manually and
removed 18 of them for the following reasons: (i) not available
in the Apple Store3, (ii) no instant messaging function, (iii) link
previews not supported, and (iv) a low number of downloads.
Table II lists the 10 apps we used for the study of this paper.
C. Threat Model
We now present the threat model of this paper. In this paper,
we assume the best scenario possible for both the attacker and
the victim, i.e., a strong attacker and a tech-savvy user.
Attacker — The attacker of this paper intends to lure their
victims into visiting a malicious web page. The specific final
attack delivered with the malicious page can vary, based on
the motivations of the attacker. For example, an attacker with
economic interest may want to steal credit card numbers with a
phishing page. In this paper, we also consider highly-motivated
powerful attackers such as state-sponsored attackers that can
use malicious pages to deliver 0-day exploits to compromise
users’ device.
The attacker uses social media platforms to distribute the
link to the malicious page. For example, in the case of social
networks, the attacker can register one or more accounts
to direct the campaign. The attacker can also use stolen
credentials to spread malicious links over a platform, including
instant messaging systems. Their goal is to post malicious links
2The main reason was the language barrier. Then, even when using
automated translation and help from a native speaker (Chinese), we were
deemed to be a robot or a non-trusted user, and denied access to the platform.
We would speculate this occurred because our mobile phone numbers were
not Chinese or because of the geo-location of our IPs.
3We ignored apps that are not in the Apple Store because of our testing
setting (See Section III). We used one iPhone device and one Android device:
one for the user sharing a link, and the other for the user clicking on the link
preview.
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Social Network Alexa
Facebook 3
Twitter 11
VK 15
LinkedIn 23
Pinterest 67
Tumblr 75
Medium 113
Xing 1.294
Plurk 1.341
MeWe 5.142
App Downloads
Instagram 1.000.000.000+
Messenger 1.000.000.000+
Skype 1.000.000.000+
Snapchat 1.000.000.000+
WhatsApp 1.000.000.000+
Line 500.000.000+
Viber 500.000.000+
KakaoTalk 100.000.000+
Telegram 100.000.000+
Slack 10.000.000+
TABLE II: List of platforms
while, on the one hand, being undetected by possible active or
passive detection systems put in place by the hosting platform
and, on the other hand, misleading the users, who make use
of the link preview to decide whether to click. To this end, the
attacker creates a mismatch between the malicious content in
the page and its benign-looking link preview, by including in
the attacker’s code specific meta tags.
Victim — The victim of these attacks can be a specific
individual or small group of individuals (i.e., targeted attack),
or as many users as possible, indiscriminately. For the analysis
of this paper, we consider skilled and experienced social
network users—a category of users who is less prone to click
on malicious URLs [27], [8], [17], [38].
III. CHARACTERIZING LINK PREVIEW CREATION
In essence, link previews synthesize a web page, creating
the expectation on what the user would see when clicking
on the preview. The analysis of this section intends to shed
some light on the ways social media platforms create link
previews. This analysis reviews the content of previews of a
set of test web pages, and identifies precisely the fields that are
displayed and under which circumstances. After presenting a
comprehensive overview of link preview creation, our analysis
studies the network traffic to retrieve the resources to build
the link preview, looking for distinctive features that can be
used to discover social media platforms’ requests. Finally, our
analysis investigates the extent to which the coherence between
previews and web pages content holds.
Experimental Setup: For the analysis of this section, we
prepared a set of controlled experiments. Our experiments in-
volve a user submitting links of test web pages we control, and
another user observing the created link preview. Accordingly,
we registered two user accounts for each platform. Facebook
is the only platform offering test accounts, which are users
separated from regular users.
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Priority
Facebook     # DP  O, H, 6T
Twitter G# G# G# G# # SU # T, O, 6H
VK  #   # DP # O||T, H
LinkedIn  #   # URL # O, H, 6T
Pinterest # #   # URL # O||H, 6T
Tumblr  G# G#  # DP # O, H, 6T
Medium     # URL # O, H, 6T
Xing  G# G#  # DP # O, H, 6T
Plurk  # G# # # URL # O, T, H
MeWe   G#  # URL # O, H, 6T
Instagram  G# G# #  - # O||T||H
Messenger      -  O, H, 6T
Snapchat  #   # - # O, T||H
WhatsApp  G# G#   - # O, H, T
Skype  G# G#   - # T, O, H
Line    #  - # O||T, H
Viber  #   # - # T, O, H
KakaoTalk  G#    - # O, H, 6T
Telegram G# G# G# G#  - # O||T, 6H
Slack G# G# G# G#  - # O, T, 6H
TABLE III: Characterization of the link preview creation. For
the visible features, we use “ ” when we observed a field in
all of our experiments, “#” when we never observed a field,
and “G#” when the presence of the field depends on the context,
e.g., meta tags or user edits. We use “DP” for dereferal page,
“SU” for shortened URL, and URL for the shared URL. For
the priority, we use “O” for Open Graph, “T” for Twitter Cards,
and “H” for standard HTML tags.
We conducted our experiments on social networks us-
ing Firefox (version 69.0 for Ubuntu 18.04), Chrome
(77.0.3865.75 for Ubuntu 18.04) and Brave Software (0.68.132
based on Chromium 76.0.3809.132 for Ubuntu 18.04)
browsers. For IMs, we purchased two mobile phone SIM cards
and used two different mobile phones for our experiments, i.e.,
an iPhone 5S (OS version 12.4.1) and an Android Pixel device
(OS version Android 9).
To serve our test pages, we set up an Internet-facing
web server serving resources over different subdomains. We
used one subdomain for each social media platform and each
experiment, achieving a high degree of isolation among the
experiments on one platform and across all platforms. Also,
we configured our web server to deliver test pages only when
accessed via one of the unique subdomains and not through
our public IP address, reducing the noise caused by bots
of search engines and rogue web scans. All web pages of
our experiments contain a unique page title, text paragraphs,
and one image. Depending on the specific test, web pages
can contain Open Graph and Twitter Cards meta tags in
different combinations. We detail the content of meta tags in
the corresponding subsection below. Finally, we logged the
main fields of the HTTP requests incoming to the server, for
further analysis.
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Facebook LinkedIn, VK, Viber Twitter, MeWe, Skype Instagram Telegram, Slack Tumblr Messenger, Kakao
Xing Medium Snapchat Pinterest Plurk Whatsapp Line
TABLE IV: Color-coded link preview layouts grouped by visual similarity, i.e., same field order and position. Color coding: Red
is for the domain name, green for the image, yellow for the site title, purple for the site description, and blue for the URL.
A. Displayed Information
Link previews intend to summarize the content of the
embedded links, by showing a site name, an image, and a brief
description of the web page’s content, typically. These fields
originate from the web page’s HTML code, either from the
standard HTML tags or from ad-hoc meta tags such as Open
Graph or Twitter Cards markups. The goal of this section is
learning the exact information shown to a user across different
social media platforms, and tracing back the content of each
preview field to the web page.
To that end, we defined a set of controlled experiments
by posting links to resources hosted on our web server, and
observing the resulting link preview. As the link preview could
show data originating from both standard HTML tags and
meta tags, we created web pages with Open Graph or Twitter
meta tags, both meta tags at the same time, and no meta tags.
When creating our test pages, we used unique values (i.e.,
titles, descriptions, and images) for each of the meta tags to
allow us to identify the exact source of the data values used
by the preview creation. Also, we intend to study the ways the
link preview may change for pages delivered with redirections.
Accordingly, we repeated our experiments using server-side
and client-side redirections. Table III summarizes the result of
our analysis.
1) Visible Features: We start our analysis by pinpointing
the exact fields that social media platforms include in link pre-
views and their location. Table III, columns “Visible Features”,
lists the displayed fields that we observed. We say that a link
preview field is visible (“ ”) when the field is present in all
previews created during our experiments. We say that a link
preview field is not visible (“#”) when the field is not present
in any link preview of our experiments. Finally, we say that
a field may be visible (symbol “G#”) when at least one link
preview shows that field. Table IV shows the position of each
field per platform.
a) Inconsistent Use and Position of Fields: All plat-
forms include a different combination of the following fields:
title of the web page, description of the web page, an image,
the domain name, and the shared URL. We observed that there
is no regular usage of these fields and that there is no field that
is always displayed. The ones that are presented by most of
the platforms are the site title (16 over 20 platforms) and the
hostname (14 platforms). Then, interestingly, the image field
is not shown all the times, and 11 platforms out of 20 may
fail in showing an image when, for example, the linked web
page does not include the meta tag for images.
When looking at the shared URL field, we observed a
noticeable difference between social networks and instant
messaging platforms. As opposed to IMs, none of the social
networks shows the shared URL in the preview. However, we
need to clarify that IMs do not have a dedicated field for the
URL. Instead, by default, IMs show the URL in the textbox
of the user’s message.
Finally, the content of link previews varies with the
presence of meta tags. Across all platforms, a total of 25
fields are not present in the link preview when the linked
web page does not include any meta tag, i.e., the web page
contains only standard HTML tags. Such behavior may be
caused by shortcomings of HTML parser, or more probably,
by intentional decisions of the developers due to the cost of
processing a large number of web pages.
b) Heterogeneous Link Preview Templates: When visit-
ing Table III per platform, one can observe that only nine plat-
forms out of 20 (Facebook, VK, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Medium,
Messenger, Snapchat, Line and Viber) create link previews
with a consistent number and types of fields, regardless the
presence of meta tags. However, when looking at the variety
of fields shown across these nine platforms, we observe four
different sets of fields indicating that there may not be an
accepted consensus on which fields constitute a link preview.
For example, the previews created by Facebook and Medium
include all fields except for the shared URL, which is instead
present in Messenger. VK, LinkedIn, Snapchat and Viber show
only site title, image, and hostname, whereas both Pinterest and
Line show a different subset of fields each (Pinterest’s title and
description have to be user-provided at posting time).
Then, the preview created by the remaining eleven plat-
forms varies with the presence of meta tags. Interestingly, the
absence of these fields is not consistent within the same plat-
form. Only three platforms (Twitter, Telegram, and Slack) fail
to build a preview of pages containing only standard HTML
tags. The previews of the other eight platforms incoherently
display fields. For example, Instagram shows only the title and
the shared URL of pages with only HTML tags.
Finally, when looking at the visual position of field in the
preview, we identified 14 distinct template layouts. Table IV
lists the layouts we observed, grouping layouts by same order
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of fields and position.
2) Priority: The second part of our analysis studies the
behavior of the platforms when processing web pages with
multiple meta tags and without meta tags. The goal of this
analysis is to learn the importance assigned to each field.
Table III, columns “Priority”, summarizes our findings. We
use the letter H for standard HTML tags, the letter O for the
Open Graph meta tags, and the letter T for Twitter Cards. The
three letters are ordered from left to right by priority. When
we cannot establish a clear priority, e.g., the preview contains
a mix of tags, we use the symbol “||”. We cross a letter when
the type of tag is never used for the preview.
Our analysis reveals that, with few exceptions, the content
of link previews originates predominantly from the meta tags,
even when they differ from the content of the page. For exam-
ple, concerning the hostname field, Facebook, Messenger and
WhatsApp show the domain name of the URL of the og:url
meta tag even when it differs from the URL hosting the
resource. We observed similar behavior with Xing, Telegram,
and Slack, that show the content of the og:site_name meta
tag in the host field. A few platforms, i.e., Pinterest and VK,
directly prompt the user for text for the preview when the
platforms fail at rendering the link preview.
Finally, we observe that Open Graph is, by far, the most
used markup language for link previews. Open Graph is also
the first one displayed by all platforms except for three, i.e.,
Twitter, Skype and Viber. While Twitter Cards seems to be
rarely used by social networks, it has a bigger userbase among
IMs, where only two platforms (Messenger and KakaoTalk) do
not seem to support it.
3) User Actions: The third analysis of this section involves
fields that a user can inspect only upon an action. We identified
two of such fields (see, Table III, columns “User Actions”).
The first field is the URL shown when the user moves
the mouse over the link preview. Typically, when moving the
mouse over an anchor tag, the browser shows in the status
bar the hyperlink. Social networks respect such an expected
behavior; however, 50% of the social networks do not show
the original URL in the status bar but prefer showing either
a shortened URL (“SU”) or a dereferer page (“DP”). By
dereferer page we indicate a social network-specific proxy
interposed between the user and the shared web page, e.g.
as a click aggregator.
The second field is specific only to Facebook and Mes-
senger. Within the link preview, both platforms show an
additional UI button—called ”Context Button”4—to display
a dialog box with additional information about the domain
name of the og:url tag. Such additional information, when
available, includes (i) content from Wikipedia, (ii) domain
name registration date from the WHOIS database, (iii) a link
to the Facebook page associated to the domain name, (iv) the
number of times that link was shared, and (v) a map showing
the locations on earth of users who shared the link.
4) Page redirections: The final analysis of this section stud-
ies the link preview generation when pages are delivered with
redirections. For that, we repeated the previous experiments
4See, https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/1004556093058199
User Agents IPs
Name # UAs Org. Bot # ASN Res. Prov.
Facebook 2 1 1 1 0 1
VK 1 0 1 1 0 1
Twitter 1 0 1 1 0 1
LinkedIn 1 0 1 1 0 1
Tumblr 1 0 1 1 0 1
Pinterest 2 1 1 1 0 1
Xing 3 0 3 2 0 2
MeWe 1 0 1 1 0 1
Plurk 1 0 1 1 0 1
Medium 5 0 5 2 0 2
Instagram 12 9 3 1 0 1
Messenger 6 3 3 1 0 1
Skype 2 1 1 1 0 1
Snapchat 3 0 3 2 1 1
WhatsApp 2 0 2 1 1 0
Line 3 2 1 2 0 2
Viber 1 0 1 1 1 0
KakaoTalk 2 1 1 2 0 2
Telegram 1 0 1 1 0 1
Slack 3 0 3 2 0 2
TABLE V: Analysis of access logs considering IP and User-
Agent for each social media platform
by concealing the URL of the final page with a redirections.
We implemented both server-side redirections with 303 and
307 status codes, and client-side redirections either via HTML
tags or via JavaScript code. The results of our analysis are not
in Table III, and we report them in this section briefly. All
platforms correctly handle server-side redirections. Facebook
is the only platform supporting client-side redirections (both
HTML and JavaScript ones). Overall, the link preview does
not differ significantly from the previews created when posting
direct links.
B. Network Signatures
After analyzing the displayed information, we look for
unique signatures in the incoming HTTP requests. Our goal
is to identify distinguishing features that can be used by the
owner of a web page to determine when the incoming request
originates from a social media platform. For this analysis, we
process the entries in our server log files to identify such
signatures.
In general, when sharing URLs to our pages on social
networks, we should expect that other users may click on
the link previews, introducing spurious entries in our logs. To
avoid the presence of user activities, we limited the visibility
of our posts whenever a platform supports such a feature. Only
two platforms do not support access restrictions, i.e., Medium
and Plurk; however, upon manual inspection, we verified our
logs did not contain any user activity but only requests from
both platforms. Finally, we point out that the same concern
does not apply for IMs as messages are visible only to the
recipient, that, in our setting, is another user under our control.
From our log files, we parsed all entries and ex-
tracted the user-agent strings and the IPs. We compared
user-agent strings against known strings for browsers, and
we looked for substrings that can be used to identify
a platform uniquely. An example of these substrings is
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“facebookexternalhit” for Facebook or “vkShare;
+http://vk.com/dev/Share” for VK. When the user
agent contains such unique strings, we classify the entry as bot.
When the user-agent string matches one of the known user-
agent strings of browsers, we classify the entry as organic.
Then, starting from the collected IPs, we resolved the au-
tonomous system numbers (ASNs) and searched the AS name
strings for unique substrings. For example, Facebook’s re-
quest originate from AS 32934, whose name is “Facebook,
Inc.”. However, not all platforms manage an autonomous
system, but they may be relying on third-party providers. For
example, Pinterest’s requests originate from AS 14618, whose
name is “Amazon AES”. When the autonomous system name
matches the name of a platform or a known network provider,
we classify the entry as a service provider.
Table V summarizes the results of our analysis. All the
20 social media platforms under test use at least one user
agent string linked to the name of the company or the service
itself, allowing for immediate traffic filtering. Of these, 13
platforms use only one user-agent header, and seven platforms
(Xing, Medium, Instagram, Messenger, Snapchat, Whatsapp
and Slack) use multiple ones. Seven platforms (Facebook,
Pinterest, Instagram, Messenger, Skype, Line, and KakaoTalk)
request web pages using user-agent strings that are indis-
tinguishable from browsers, posing a potential problem for
the identification. However, the analysis of the IPs and the
ASes provides a stronger signal than user-agents. As a matter
of fact, all platforms perform HTTP requests from IPs of
either one or two autonomous systems that can be linked
to the platforms. Three instant messaging apps (Whatsapp,
Snapchat, Viber) request resources directly from the user’s
phone, slightly increasing the difficulty in distinguishing if the
visitor is organic or not, as the AS usually is from a residential
area; nonetheless, all three of them include the app name in the
user-agent string, so we can categorize the respective entries
as bots.
C. Link Preview Coherence
The final analysis of this section investigates the coherence
between the link preview and the web page. In particular, we
are interested in studying the ways social media platforms
keep up to date the link previews in which a page changes
over time. To this end, we generated new, unique URLs,
one for each platform, and posted them. Then, we developed
a bot controlling a pool of web browsers which is visiting
periodically (every 30m) the platforms’ pages showing the
preview, over a period of 14 days. As IMs messages are
expected to be short lived, we did not consider them for these
experiments.
The analysis of our logs revealed that eight out of 10 social
networks request the page at least once on the submission
date, and never again. Twitter and Pinterest are two exceptions,
requesting the web page multiple times across a period of 14
days. For what concerns the associated resources, seven social
networks requested them only once at submission time, and
never again. The remaining three platforms, i.e., Facebook,
Twitter and LinkedIn, request the link preview images more
regularly.
D. Takeaway
The analysis of this section shed some light on three key
aspects of social media platforms when creating a link preview.
To summarize, this section makes the following findings:
• Social media platforms rely unconditionally on meta
tags for rendering previews, especially on the Open
Graph markup language. When meta tags are not
present, link previews display fields in an inconsistent
manner, exposing users to a great variety of heteroge-
neous link preview templates. As a result of all this, we
speculate that users are misled into taking the wrong
security decision. Also, the heterogeneity of templates
and inconsistent use of fields may fail in building a
secure mental model of link preview outlooks.
• Platforms’ requests contain distinguishable signatures
that can be used by web sites owners to determine
when a request originates from social media platforms.
This is a required feature to enable cloaking attacks.
• The temporal analysis reveals that platforms tend to
fetch the resources for the link preview very rarely
over a period of 14 days. A longer time window may
show a different behavior, however, it should be noted
that 14 days is sufficient for a successful malicious
campaign.
IV. MALICIOUS CONTENT AND USER AWARENESS
Section III studied the behavior of social media platforms
when sharing links to benign web content. However, as ob-
served by prior work, adversaries can also share malicious
content on social media platforms such as phishing pages (see,
e.g., [29], [32]). Anecdotal evidence suggests that social media
platforms, social networks in particular, may have deployed
defenses to counter the spread of malicious content in their
systems. For example, Twitter claims to match shared links
against a database of potentially harmful URLs [36] and to
additionally use their shortening service to interpose informa-
tive safeguarding pages in between https://t.co links and
their malicious targets. Facebook reports the employment of
dedicated teams and tools against spam on the platform [12],
as well as anti-virus measures in the file upload and download
processes [10].
The second analysis of this paper studies the presence
and effectiveness of possible deployed countermeasures when
sharing malicious URLs. Also, our analysis reviews the created
link previews to evaluate to what extent users may be aware
of the risk of clicking on previews of malicious links. In this
section, we leverage on the knowledge acquired during the
observations of Section III, which we will use as a behavioral
baseline to compare social media platforms behavior when
dealing with malicious content. Our focus is not built on the
attacker’s perspective, rather on the observation of existing
active or passive countermeasures preventing the distribution
of malicious content; the most fitting scenario is the one of
malware and phishing spread prevention.
Experimental Setup: The experiments of this section
involve sharing links to two types of malicious content to
check for the presence of different countermeasures. First,
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Direct Virut/EICAR Posted           - - - - - - - - - -
Preview  # H# # H# H# #  # H# - - - - - - - - - -
Blacklisted URL Posted  ×     -  -            
Preview  #  ×  H# -  -          # #
Client Red. Virut/EICAR Posted           - - - - - - - - -
Preview    #       - - - - - - - - -
Blacklisted URL Posted       -  -            
Preview       -  -            
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Blacklisted URL Posted  ×     -  -            
Preview  #  # H# H# -  - H#         # #
TABLE VI: Test results when sharing a malware and a blacklisted URL.
we want to test platforms against the presence of URL fil-
tering mechanisms. For example, a social network may check
whether the shared URL is flagged as malicious by existing
URL blacklists, e.g., Google SafeBrowsing [14]. Accordingly,
we searched for URLs on PhishTank [23] and verified that
the URLs are also blacklisted by Google SafeBrowsing [14].
We used a total of three different blacklisted URLs across
platforms, all with the same characteristics, due to their short
uptime before being deactivated. Second, we want to check
whether platforms proactively scan the content of web pages
for malicious content. To this end, we created unique links to
our server to download the trojan Win32.Virut. For IMs, we
did not perform such an experiment as downloading mobile
apps through a browser is not a major attack vector.
When running our tests, we also monitored the exact point
where we can observe the effects of any countermeasures. In
our analysis, we considered two points: when posting the URL,
and when creating the link preview. Table VI shows the result
of our analysis.
A. URL Posting
The first aspect that we monitored during the execution
of our experiments is whether the platform accepts malicious
URLs. Only Twitter detected the blacklisted URL as malicious
and prevented posting altogether. Also, Twitter showed a warn-
ing message: This request looks like it might be automated. To
protect our users from spam and other malicious activity, we
can’t complete this action right now. Please try again later. All
other platforms did not show any error or warning messages
and created a URL preview instead.
B. Preview Creation
Social media platforms can detect malicious URLs in later
stages of the URL processing pipeline, e.g., when fetching the
resources. However, our analysis revealed that the vast majority
of platforms do not seem to implement any security check.
a) Malware: When sharing the malware program, all
platforms correctly retrieved the binary from our server. How-
ever, as the binary program does not contain HTML code,
platforms tend to render a bare-minimum link preview (i.e.,
Facebook, Xing), possibly prompting the user to provide more
information (i.e., VK, Pinterest, Tumblr, and MeWe) or render
no preview at all (i.e., Twitter, LinkedIn, Medium, and Plurk).
Also, all platforms did not show any error message or warning,
and, clicking on the link preview results in downloading the
malware program.
b) Blacklisted URL: When sharing a blacklisted
URL, only one platform, i.e., LinkedIn, detected
the malicious URL after posting. Here, LinkedIn
modified the text of the link to point to a
redirector page (linkedin.com/redir/phishing-
page?url=$URL). When a user clicks on the preview,
Linkedin shows an informative page explaining that the site
was blacklisted according to Google Safe Browsing, thus
blocking access to the target URL. In spite of repeated
attempts, the user account was not deactivated.
Sixteen social media platforms over 18 treated the black-
listed links as regular links: their bots visit the page and render
a preview based on the specified meta tags (if any) or fall back
to parsing HTML, when possible. Eight social media platforms
(Facebook, VK, MeWe for SNs and Messenger, Snapchat,
Line, Viber, KakaoTalk for IMs) created a rich preview with no
distinguishable difference from a regular innocuous link. The
remaining eight platforms either showed partial information
(page title and host, but no image and no description) or did
not render a preview at all, due to their implementation.
C. Takeaway
The analysis of this section intends to investigate the
presence of possible mechanisms to prevent the distribution
of malicious URLs on social media platforms. To summarize,
our analysis makes the following findings:
• In general, our experiments could not find evidence
of widespread use of countermeasures to prevent the
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distribution of malicious content at submission time.
• All platforms—except for Twitter and LinkedIn—
do not show specific warnings or error messages to
the users, indicating potential danger when clicking
on the previews. Also, link previews for blacklisted
URLs can contain the same semantic elements that
are typical of previews of benign web pages, i.e., title,
description, a picture, and the domain name.
• Two out of 20 social media platforms perform security
checks on the posted URL. For example, LinkedIn
uses the Google Safe Browsing API to detect mali-
cious URLs. While Twitter forbids posting blacklisted
URLs, LinkedIn accepts the URLs, but it replaces the
URL in the preview with a link to an own warning
page.
• Twitter and LinkedIn are the only two platforms
implementing a form of defense. However, we could
bypass these defenses by using server- and client-side
redirections.
V. ATTACKS
So far, we studied the behaviors of social media platforms
when processing both benign and malicious webpages, and we
learned the various ways platforms could create link previews
and validate URLs. This section will take a look at the link
preview creation from an adversarial point of view. Here, we
consider an attacker who intends to lure one or more users to
visit a malicious webpage that is distributed over social media
platforms. To do so, the attacker needs to hide their malicious
intent by using, ideally, a benign-looking link preview. At
the same time, as platforms may be validating URLs against
blacklists, the attacker needs to avoid the detection of mali-
cious URLs. In this section, we consider both problems. First,
in Section V-A, we present a set of shortcomings of social
media platforms that allow attackers with different capabilities
to craft arbitrary link previews, regardless of the actual content
or purpose of the shared page. Then, in Section V-B, we show
how an attacker can bypass URL validation countermeasures.
We summarize our attacks in Table VII. Overall, our
results show that all platforms are vulnerable to our attacks—
except for two (Plurk and Medium) that we did not test with
malicious URLs as they cannot limit the visibility of posts.
Four platforms, i.e., Facebook, Xing, Plurk, and Slack, can be
attacked by attackers who control the content of a webpage
only. The remaining platforms are vulnerable to attackers who
can also register domain names for the server distributing
malicious pages.
A. Adversarial Analysis of the Link Previews Creation
The goal consists in creating a malicious web page whose
preview, when shared on social media platforms, is similar
to the preview of a benign webpage, requiring an attacker to
be able to replace the content of each field with ones of their
choice. In this section, we study the extent to which an attacker
can arbitrarily influence the link preview creation considering
two attackers with different capabilities, i.e., a first one that
controls the content of a web page and an another one that
can also register domain names. Table VII shows the results
of our analysis.
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Facebook u u u u - - - 3 Page cnt.
Twitter u u u 3 - 3 - 3 Domain
VK u - u 3 - - - 3 Domain
LinkedIn u - u 3 - - 3 3 Domain
Pinterest - - u 3 - - - 3 Domain
Tumblr u u u 3 - - - 3 Domain
Medium u u u 3 - - - - Domain
Xing u u u u - - - 3 Page cnt.
Plurk u - u - - - - - Page cnt.
MeWe u u u 3 - - - 3 Domain
Instagram u u u - 3 - - 3 Domain
Messenger u u u u 3 - - 3 Domain
Snapchat u - u 3 - - - 3 Domain
WhatsApp u u u u 3 - - 3 Domain
Skype u u u 3 - - - 3 Domain
Line u u u - 3 - - 3 Domain
Viber u - u 3 - - - 3 Domain
KakaoTalk u u u 3 3 - - 3 Domain
Telegram u u u u 3 - - 3 Domain
Slack u u u u u - - 3 Page cnt.
TABLE VII: Summary of the evaluation of our attacks. We
use “u” when the attacker can change a field via HTML tags.
We use “3” when the attacker can replace the value of a field
via the domain name of the malicious URL. We use “3” when
a bypass technique and attack succeeded. Finally, we use “-
” when the field is not present or when we did not test the
platform.
1) Crafting Fields: We evaluate the replacement of the
preview fields considering two types of attacker models. The
first one is a person that can create malicious web pages and
upload them on a web server. This setting intends to model the
common scenario where the attacker exploits vulnerabilities
in existing servers or web applications to upload malicious
content such as phishing pages. Since this attacker controls the
web page content, they can modify the title, the description,
and the images with ones of their choice. Here, the attacker can
store the selected values in the meta tags or the standard HTML
tags. In Table VII, we mark these field with “u”. However,
such an attacker may not be able to alter the content of the
domain name and the shared URL.
The second type of attacker possesses the capabilities of the
previous attacker and extends them with the ability to register
domain names. This scenario intends to model the typical
attacker that registers fraudulent domain names to support
their malicious activities. Being able to register domain names
extends the abilities of the previous attacker as it allows for
crafting the domain name and shared URL too.
In the remainder, we present our analysis, discussing in
detail what an attacker could do to change the content of these
two fields. We grouped our results in five distinct classes based
on the observed behaviors:
a) Link Previews without Domain Name: One platform,
i.e., Plurk, does not include any information regarding the
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landing page URL, i.e., neither the domain name nor the
original URL. In this case, the creation of a crafted link
preview is straightforward. An example of preview for Plurk
is Figure 3b.
Instagram and Line do not show the domain name either.
However, we point out that they show the original URL. In
our experiments, we could not find a way to remove or replace
the string of the shared URL from the preview. Accordingly,
it can be changed only by an attacker who has full control of
the URL string.
b) Replacing Domain Name using og:url: In Face-
book, we observed that when the URL of the shared webpage
mismatches the og:url meta tag, the preview fields title,
image, description and host are retrieved from the webpage
hosted at the URL specified in the og:url meta tag rather
than in the shared one. Nonetheless, the final landing page
remains the URL of the shared web page. In this case, the
attacker can assign to the tag og:url a URL of a benign re-
source, resulting in a preview that is entirely indistinguishable
from a benign preview. Figure 3c shows such a benign-looking
preview. The Messenger app shows the same behavior, but the
attacker cannot remove the shared URL from the message text;
due to the mismatch between the shared URL and the preview,
we say that this attack is possible only for an attacker that can
register domain names.
WhatsApp replaces the content of the host field only,
showing the URL specified in the og:url meta tag. Also in
this case, the shared URL cannot be removed from the message
text, requiring the attacker to register a new domain name for
this purpose.
c) Removing Shared URLs in IMs: One IM platform,
i.e., Slack, permits the editing of the content of sent messages.
We verified that a user could edit the URL string of a message
too, after the creation of the preview, effectively eliminating
this field from the rendered preview. The platforms Snapchat,
Skype and Viber remove the URL from the message text after
posting, although we observe that they include the domain
name in the preview, which is extracted directly from the
shared URL. We could not find a way to replace the domain
name with an arbitrary string. Therefore, this attack may not
be successful for an attacker controlling the webpage content
only.
d) Replacing Domain using og:site_name: During
our experiments, we discovered that three platforms, i.e., Xing,
Telegram and Slack, replace the domain name with the content
of the og:site_name meta tag.
As mentioned before, Slack allows removing the shared
URL from the message text after posting the link. Accordingly,
an attacker can generate a preview that looks like a benign one
only by controlling the HTML code of the page. Figure 3a
shows an example of such a link preview.
Xing does not include the original URL; therefore, con-
trolling the web page content is sufficient to craft a URL
preview where the domain name is replaced with the site name.
Figure 3d shows such a link preview.
Then, replacing the domain name of Telegram’s preview
with the og:site_name meta tag may not be sufficient as
(a) Slack
(b) Plurk
(c) Facebook
(d) Xing
Fig. 3: Examples of maliciously-crafted previews by an at-
tacker who controls the content of a webpage. In all these
examples, the shared page does not include the text in de-
scription, nor the displayed image.
(a) Twitter (b) Tumblr
(c) Messenger
(d) Telegram
Fig. 4: Examples of crafted previews that always show the
domain name. The red box shows the position of the domain
name.
Telegram includes the shared URL that we could not remove.
Accordingly, the creation of a Telegram’s preview is more
suitable for an attacker that can register domain names.
2) Attacks: To summarize, our analysis shows that it is
possible to create an attack against each platform. Our attacks
can create entirely indistinguishable link previews against four
platforms, i.e., Facebook, Xing, Plurk, and Slack, by changing
only the content of the malicious web page. In three cases,
the attacker needs to exploit seemingly innocuous behaviors of
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the platforms to achieve their goal. For example, on Facebook,
the attacker can replace the domain name with the domain of
og:url meta tag, whereas for Xing and Slack, the attacker
can replace the domain name by using the og:site_name
tag. As Slack includes the shared URL too, the attacker can
also remove the original URL from the preview after its
creation. We point out that, in all these four cases, even when
the attacker replaces or hides the domain names and the shared
URLs, the landing pages, i.e., the malicious pages, of the link
preview remain unchanged. When the attacker controls the
domain name, then the remaining platforms can be targeted
as well. Figure 4 show examples of partially crafted link
previews. The areas in red contain either the domain name or
the original URL. Finally, the evaluation for two platforms,
i.e., Medium and Plurk, was limited to the generation of
the previews. On these two platforms, we did not share any
malicious URLs as they cannot restrict the visibility of the
shared content.
B. Bypassing Countermeasures
When sharing malicious content, social media platforms
may detect the maliciousness of the shared web page. As
shown in Section IV, only two platforms can detect when
a URL is known to be distributing malware by using, e.g.,
Google Safe Browsing [14]. In this section, we focus on these
two platforms and show that, despite the efforts of validating
URLs, it is possible to bypass these controls by creating ad-
hoc web pages. In this page, we consider two approaches that
are based on the findings of Sections III-A4 and III-B.
1) Redirections: During our experiments of Section III-A4,
we observed that all platforms except for one (Facebook) do
not support HTTP redirections. As a result, those platforms
may not be able to determine the next URL in the redi-
rection chain, and accordingly, they should fail in verifying
whether the URL is malicious. We tested our hypothesis and
confirmed that client-side redirections could effectively bypass
both Twitter and LinkedIn URL validation. The evaluation with
redirections is summarized in Table VI.
However, interestingly, we also found out that it is possible
to bypass the URL filtering of LinkedIn with a server-side
redirection, i.e., 30x response. Here, we suspect that LinkedIn
does not validate the Location header of the HTTP response
sent by the redirector.
2) Link Cloaking: As a final step, an attacker may resort
to cloaking attacks. The analysis Section III-B showed that
the source IP and the user agent strings of the social media
platforms are unique, and an attacker can leverage on these
features to change the behavior of the servers selectively. For
example, when the incoming request matches one of the known
signatures, the server will deliver the benign web page for link
preview creation. Otherwise, the server delivers the malicious
web page.
VI. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, we discuss our results and distill a set
of recommendations for social media platforms towards the
creation of more reliable link previews.
A. Variety of Layouts and Processing Rules Can Lead to
Underestimate the Risk
Our results show a great variety of layouts used by the plat-
forms under evaluation. We distinguished 14 distinct templates
for link previews. Also, we observed that the same platform
could create many variants of the same template, for example,
by removing or replacing fields.
The variety that we observed suggests that there is no gen-
eral consensus on (i) which fields constitute a link preview, (ii)
under which circumstances fields are displayed, and (iii) the
processing rules and priority. The lack of consensus can have a
dramatic impact on the way users evaluate the trustworthiness
of a preview. As users can be exposed to different layouts,
they may neglect the importance of a field, underestimating
the overall security risks of a link.
(R1) Standardize Content and Construction Rules of Link
Previews: Our first recommendation is to define and agree on
the content of link previews, and the exact rules to construct
them.
B. Distrustful Scenario
The scenario in which social platforms operate is charac-
terized by distrust. On the one hand, social platforms cannot
verify the truthfulness of webpages content. For example,
they cannot decide whether an image or a title is appropriate
for a given page. Accordingly, social platforms cannot trust
webpages. On the other hand, users can leverage on their
own experiences and skills to navigate the web and inspect
both URLs and the circumstances that led them to see those
URLs looking for warning signals, indicating that pages may
be dangerous. Experienced users may be trusting webpages
they are familiar with, e.g., their web email provider; however,
in the general case, they will not trust any page.
In a scenario with these trust relationships, social media
platforms act as intermediaries between web pages and users,
providing to the latter syntheses of the former. In playing such
a role, social platforms should avoid introducing interpretations
of the content of the webpages or using processing rules
that can hide or distort the preview of the page. Also, social
platforms should enforce the presence of security-relevant
fields that users can use to decide whether to click, i.e., domain
names, and original URLs. While most of the social platforms
under test include a domain name or the original URL, four
of them, i.e., Facebook, Xing, Plurk, and Slack do not satisfy
such a requirement. From the analysis of these four platforms,
we derive the following recommendations:
(R2) Show Domain or URL: As reported in Table III and
further detailed in Section V-A1a, the link preview created
by the social network Plurk does not include any host field,
and there is no URL in the post text. As this information is
significant in assessing the trustworthiness of the link preview,
we include as part of our recommendations that link previews
must include either the domain name or the shared URL.
Among the platforms under evaluation, only Plurk does not
comply with our recommendation.
(R3) Limit Edits of Posts or Refresh Previews: Platforms
may want to allow users to edit previous posts. In these cases,
they should forbid changing the shared URLs. Alternatively,
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<head>
<title>HTML title</title>
<meta property="og:site_name" content="¬">
<meta property="og:title" content="­" />
<meta property="og:description" content="®">
<meta property="og:image" content="¯"/>
<meta name="twitter:title" content="­">
<meta name="twitter:description" content="®">
<meta name="twitter:image" content="¯">
</head>
<body>
<!-- Malicious content -->
</body>
Listing (2) Example of Malicious Page Shared on Slack (a) Rendered Preview
Fig. 5: Example of Malicious Link Preview.
when changing the URL is admitted, platforms should re-build
the link preview and replace the old preview with the new
one. In our experiments, and in particular in Section V-A1c,
we observed that Slack allows users to remove URLs from
previous messages without updating the link preview. This
feature can be misused as shown in Figure 3a, especially if
the domain name field contains an arbitrary string rather than
the actual domain or URL.
(R4) Create Preview Without Retrieving Referred Pages:
Platforms should create link previews using data items con-
tained in the code of the landing page. When the landing
page contains external links such as og:url, platforms could
consider such resources as long as they are in the same domain
as the landing page. Furthermore, platforms should not use
such URLs to build the entire preview. In Section V-A1b, we
observed that Facebook creates the entire preview by using
the content of the URL in the og:url tag, and an attacker
can hide a malicious webpage by creating a link preview
with a YouTube video using only the og:url meta tag (see,
Figure 5a).
(R5) Type Fields: In Section III-A2 we observed that, in a
few social platforms, it is possible to override the content of
the domain name field by adding the og:site_name meta
tag. When the platform additionally does not include the shared
URL in the text field of the post, as observed in Section V-A1d
for the social network Xing, the final link preview contains
no trusted information on the URL, as the domain field can
contain an arbitrary string. Therefore, we recommend that
each field of a link preview should have a well-defined type,
e.g., image, description, title, domain, and URL. Then, when
creating a preview, platforms should not use the content of a
field of type t1 to fill a field of a different type t2.
C. Upstream vs Downstream URL Validation
During the lifetime of a link preview, there are different
points in time when malicious links can be detected, e.g., when
platforms accept the URL and when users click on the preview.
In the remaining, we discuss where and how such a check
should be enforced.
(R6) Do Upstream URL Validation: When testing social
media platforms against phishing URLs, we observed that
not all browsers could show Google Safe Browsing warn-
ing messages before loading malicious URLs. In particular,
we verified that the in-app browsers as used per default
configuration by Messenger, Slack, Telegram, Line, Insta-
gram, and WhatsApp (both on Android and iOS) do not
show any warning when loading our phishing URLs. Also,
we verified that external browser apps might not reliably
show Safe Browsing warnings. We reproduced such behavior
on Chrome Browser 76.0.3809.123 for iOS 12.4.1, Chrome
for Android (Android 9,Pixel Build/PQ3A.190801.002 and
Pixel 2 Build/PQ3A.190801.002), Safari (12.1.2 Mobile),
Brave Browser for Android (1.3.2 based on Chromium
76.0.3809.132), and Firefox Focus for Android (8.0.16). Only
one mobile browser, i.e., Firefox for Android (68.1), showed
the warning correctly. We point out that we used the default
configuration of both all tested apps and the operating systems.
Finally, desktop browsers were more consistent than the mobile
ones in showing the warning. Here, we tested Chrome Browser
(77.0.3865.75 for Ubuntu 18.04), Brave Software Browser
(0.68.132 based on Chromium 76.0.3809.132 for Ubuntu
18.04), and Firefox (69.0 for Ubuntu 18.04). Independent non-
academic research confirmed the presence of a discrepancy
between Google Safe Browsing mobile and desktop. See, for
example, [26], [19].
The reasons for such a discrepancy are not fully under-
stood, and further research is required. Nevertheless, such
results indicate that browsers may fail to or will not detect ma-
licious URLs, and, accordingly, browser-side countermeasures
should not be considered as a bulletproof last line of defense.
Based on that, we recommend developers to implement up-
stream URL validation during the generation of link previews.
Among the 20 platforms we verified, only two implement such
a mechanism.
(R7) Do Proper URL Validation: An HTTP agent can reach
web resources by following chains of redirections. While in the
past redirections were only implemented via HTTP response
codes and the refresh HTML meta tag, nowadays redirections
are also implemented via JavaScript code. When validating
URLs, it is fundamental that all URLs of a redirection chain
are validated as well. Unfortunately, the only two platforms
implementing a form of URL validation (Twitter and LinkedIn)
did not validate URLs during redirections, allowing attackers
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to bypass their countermeasures. Table VI sums up the results
of our experiments with these two social networks.
D. Ethical Considerations
Our experiments raise the valid ethical concern of sharing
malicious content on social media platforms. For example,
users not aware of our experiments may click on our previews
and become victim of an attack. To avoid attacking users,
we limited the visibility of the shared malicious links of the
platform accounts we control. When the platform did not
support limiting the post visibility, i.e. for the social networks
Medium and Plurk, we did not share the phishing link and,
instead of distributing the Win32.Virut malware, we used the
innocuous EICAR test file, used to test antivirus software.
The second concern of our experiments is sharing malware
from our servers. The main risk of these experiments is
that both the network and the domain name of our institute
may be blacklisted, affecting the work of the research and
administration staff. To avoid such a risk, we registered a first-
level domain name and moved our servers on Amazon Web
Service EC2.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review works related to our study.
First, we present relevant works in the area of the analysis
of malicious URLs in social networks. Then, we related our
work with the research done in the area of phishing.
A. Analysis of Clicks on Social Platforms
When deciding whether to click on link previews, users
rely on an ensemble of signals that are displayed by the social
platform’s web pages. For example, Redmiles et al. [27] show
that users take into account who shares the web content and
the online community the content originates from. Similarly to
Redmiles et al. [27], our work intends to shed some light on
the dynamics behind user clicks on social networks. However,
as opposed to Redmiles et al. [27], our work does not study
social connections between users or user properties such as
demographics. Instead, our work focuses on the content of a
link preview, the trustworthiness of the link preview creation,
and it explores the extent to which an attacker can control the
fields displayed to the victims.
Clicking on maliciously-crafted link previews is a security
concern that Facebook tackled in 2017 by forbidding users
to modify link previews from the web site [28]. Also, an
independent work by Barak Tawily [33] showed that Facebook
link previews can be modified via metatags. Our study expands
the one by Tawily [33] and shows that motivated attackers
can still control the content of a preview by crafting ad-
hoc HTML tags of the shared pages. Also, our study shows
that the problem is not affecting only Facebook, but it is a
systematic problem affecting most of the social platforms that
we evaluated.
B. Phishing in Social Networks
A typical phishing attack involves an attacker, their victim,
and a malicious resource used as a bait, to convince the user
to provide sensitive information. To this end, attackers usually
impersonate existing institutions or services (e.g. banks) to dif-
ferent degrees of similarity: replicating the impersonated target
to a high degree increases their chances of success, e.g. through
the choice of a visually-similar domain, or through reusing
graphics and logos. With the increase in popularity experienced
by social media platforms, attackers found means to either
directly reach targeted victims, also having the possibility to
collect their data and increase the success likelihood, or to get
in touch with large crowds in much broader campaigns. For
example, Han et al. [16] mention Facebook among the top-five
organizations targeted by phishers, also showing how attackers
install off-the-shelf phishing kits in compromised web servers,
where the attack is active for a short time before being
moved to another location. Phishing attacks usually employ a
considerable number of redirections, to avoid detection, evade
blacklists and filter traffic. Previous work [29], [31] studied
redirection chains for malicious pages detection, also applied
in the context of social networks (i.e., Twitter). Detection of
phishing pages can also be done by inspecting the content
and structure of a webpage (e.g., Pan et al. [24]) or the URL
structure (e.g., Chou et al. [7]).
As opposed to this body of works, our study does not
present new detection techniques for phishing pages. How-
ever, similarly to phishing pages, an attacker can create link
previews that are visually similar to benign ones, masking thus
the malicious intention of the landing page.
C. Detection of Malicious Content
As social networks gained popularity, attackers started
using them as a vector to spread malicious URLs, beyond
phishing attacks such as drive-by download. The detection of
these URLs has been the focus of several works. For example,
Lee et al. [29] proposed a technique to detect malicious URLs
based on the chains of redirections. Similarly, Thomas et
al. [34] presented a technique to evaluate URLs shared not
only on social networks but also on other web services such
as blogs and webmails. In another line of work, the detection of
malicious pages focused on inspecting their content, for both
desktop browsers (e.g., Canali et al. [6]) and mobile browsers
(e.g., Amrutkar et al. [1]). As opposed to these works, our
paper does not present a detection technique, but it studies how
social platforms behave when preparing previews of malicious
URLs.
Finally, in a recent work, Bell et al. [4] measured the
reactivity of the malicious URL detection system of Twitter,
discovering that a significant number of malicious URLs re-
main undetected for at least 20 days. Such a study is orthogonal
to the one present in our work, i.e., our work explores the ways
social platforms generate previews in an adversarial setting,
whereas Bell et al. [4] perform measurements on the reactivity
of countermeasures. Also, to a certain extent, Bell et al. [4]
underline the severity of the current state of link previews in
social platforms too.
D. Cloaking Attacks
Another area related to our work is the area of cloaking
attacks. In a cloaking attack, the attacker significantly alters the
web page content when visited by a crawler or bot to conceal
the malicious purpose of the page [40]. When compared to our
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work, attackers could use cloaking attacks to generate decep-
tive link previews, where the page content is changed to look
benign only when visited by social platforms’ bots. However,
cloaking attacks can be detected, and over the past years, the
research community has proposed several ideas. For example,
Wang et al. [39] show four techniques to detect user agent
and IP cloaking put in place by web sites to deceive search
engine crawlers. Similarly, Invernizzi et al. [18] used ready-to-
use cloaking programs retrieved from the underground market
to create a classifier for the detection. Social platforms could
use these techniques to detect cloaking attacks; however, it is
important to point out that it will not be sufficient to prevent
the creation of deceptive previews. As we showed in our
study, complying to our recommendations is hard in practice,
and attackers can exploit a variety of implementation pitfalls
(see, Section VI) to craft malicious previews and distribute
unwanted content over social platforms.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a comprehensive analysis of
link previews on social media platforms. First, we explored
different ways in which their content is specified and how
most of the platforms studied have a different rendering format
for the same meta tags. We highlighted how this variability
can cause the user not to understand which preview fields
are security critical, leading them to uninformed security
decisions. Then, we showed that it is possible to misuse
the preview-rendering service, as this relies entirely on the
content of the meta tags without inspecting the web page any
further: in four social media platforms, we were able to craft
benign-looking link previews leading to potentially malicious
webpages. Crafting a benign-looking preview for the remaining
16 social media platform requires only the ability to register
a new domain.
Next, we observed the presence of any active or passive
countermeasures employed by social media platforms against
the spread of known malicious URLs and software, and found
that only two over 20 platforms perform active checks on the
shared URL, and that even in these two cases, cross-checks
can be bypassed through client- and server-side redirections.
On this matter, we reported possible inconsistencies with
the safe browsing services on mobile phones, supporting our
recommendation on upstream checks, performed directly by
the social media platforms. We concluded our work with a
discussion, analyzing the impact of misleading previews on
users’ behavior, evaluating the resulting security risks, and
suggesting seven recommendations for possible improvements.
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